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both the hierarchy of authority and the degree of participation in decision-making, 
while strategy is measured as the extent to which service providers are prospectors, 
defenders and reactors. We find that centralization has no independent effect on 
service performance, even when controlling for prior performance, service 
expenditure and external constraints. However, the impact of centralization is 
contingent on the strategic orientation of organizations. Centralized decision-making 
works best in conjunction with defending, and decentralized decision-making works 
best in organizations that emphasize prospecting.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Service improvement is at the heart of contemporary debates in public management. 
Governments across the globe have introduced a swathe of reforms to enhance the 
effectiveness and responsiveness of public services (Batley and Larbi 2004; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert 2004). Many of these policies have focused attention on the internal 
characteristics of public organizations. In particular, the degree to which decision-
making is centralized and the quality of strategic management have been identified by 
policy-makers and scholars as determinants of public service performance that are 
readily susceptible to political and managerial control. The mantras of New Public 
Management (particularly its general preference for decentralized organizational 
structures, see Osborne and Gaebler 1992), have greatly influenced these 
developments. Decentralization is hypothesized to improve public services by 
empowering service managers to make service delivery decisions, while effective 
strategizing is thought to make organizations flexible and “fit for purpose”. These 
ideas were reflected in the Reinventing Government movement in the US, and more 
recently have formed an integral part of the modernization agenda pursued by the 
Labour government in the UK (Walker and Boyne 2006).  
Governments have sought to encourage the adoption of more decentralized 
structures as a means for improving decision-making and enhancing the customer 
orientation of public organizations. In addition to a focus on developing new 
organizational structures, they are also increasingly urging public managers to adopt 
more enterprising and innovative strategies for delivering services (e.g. OPSR 2002; 
Performance and Innovation Unit 2001). Such prescriptions for internal change 
present an ideal opportunity for public management scholars seeking to understand 
the relationship between organizational characteristics and performance. What 
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organizational structures are conducive to better performance? Are these mediated by 
other important internal organizational features? In particular, Miles and Snow’s 
classic (1978) account of strategic management argues that organizations will perform 
better if their structure follows their strategy. Does performance improve when 
decision-making within public organizations is tightly aligned with strategy?  
In the first part of the article we develop hypotheses on the impact of 
centralization and strategy on public service performance. The second part of the 
article describes our research design, data and measures. The results of our statistical 
analysis of the performance of Welsh local service departments are then presented and 
discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the relationship between centralization, 
strategy and performance in the public sector.  
 
CENTRALIZATION AND PERFORMANCE  
One of the core functions for public managers is the creation of appropriate structures 
that can provide system stability and institutional support for a host of other internal 
organizational elements, such as values and routines (O’Toole and Meier 1999). The 
degree to which decision-making is centralized or decentralized is a key indicator of 
the manner in which an organization allocates resources and determines policies and 
objectives. It is, moreover, an issue that has long been recognized as a critical area of 
research on organizational structure (see Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner 1968). 
For organizational theorists, the relative degree of centralization within an 
organization is signified by the “hierarchy of authority” and the “degree of 
participation in decision-making”, as these aspects of structure reflect the distribution 
of power across the entire organization (Carter and Cullen 1984; Glisson and Martin 
1980; Hage and Aiken 1967, 1969). Indeed, a large number of studies of 
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organizational structure in the public, private and nonprofit sectors measure the extent 
of centralization by assessing both of these dimensions of centralization (Allen and 
LaFollette 1977; Carter and Cullen 1984; Dewar, Whetten and Boje 1980; Hage and 
Aiken 1967, 1969; Glisson and Martin 1980; Jarley, Fiorito and Delaney 1997; 
Negandhi and Reimann 1973). Hierarchy of authority refers to the extent to which the 
power to make decisions is exercised at the upper levels of the organizational 
hierarchy, while participation in decision-making pertains to the degree of staff 
involvement in the determination of organizational policy. 
A centralized organization will typically have a high degree of hierarchical 
authority and low levels of participation in decisions about policies and resources; 
while a decentralized organization will be characterized by low hierarchical authority 
and highly participative decision-making. Thus, where only one or a few individuals 
make decisions, an organizational structure may be described as highly centralized. 
By contrast, the least centralized organizational structure possible is one in which all 
organization members are responsible for and involved in decision-making.  
The relationship between structure and performance is a timeless concern for 
students of public administration. Woodrow Wilson (1887) suggested that 
“philosophically viewed” the discipline was chiefly concerned with “the study of the 
proper distribution of constitutional authority” (213). Classical theorists of 
bureaucracy regard the relative degree of centralization as integral to understanding 
how an organization’s decision-making processes are conducive to greater 
organizational efficiency (Gulick and Urwick 1937; Weber 1947). Although these 
early theorists primarily focused on the degree of hierarchical authority within 
organizations, the extent of decision participation has increasingly become recognized 
as a critically important aspect of centralization (see Carter and Cullen 1984). Herbert 
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Simon (1976) stressed that an organization’s anatomy was constituted both by the 
allocation and the distribution of decision-making functions.  
By providing an indication of “how power is distributed among social 
positions” throughout an organization (Hage and Aiken 1967, 77), the “hierarchy of 
authority” and “participation in decision-making” can illustrate how the “structuring” 
of an organization has implications for organizational effectiveness (Dalton, Todor, 
Spendolini, Fielding and Porter 1980). There is a wealth of material on organizational 
centralization and performance in the private sector (e.g. Adler and Borys 1996; Jung 
and Avolio 1999; Kirkman and Rosen 1999) and a growing literature on street-level 
bureaucracy in the public sector, pertaining to those individuals responsible for 
directly providing public services, such as teachers, police officers and social workers 
(e.g. Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Ricucci 2005). However, 
there is still comparatively little research investigating the effects of the degree of 
centralization within public organizations on public service performance. 
Organizational structures are assumed to provide a pervasive foundation for 
achieving coordination and control within an organization. They simultaneously 
constrain and prescribe the behaviour of organization members (Hall 1982), and 
perform a symbolic function indicating that someone is “in charge” (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). As a result, it may reasonably be expected that the degree of 
centralization will have a significant effect on organizational outcomes. Some 
researchers contend that even modest improvements in the structuring of 
organizations can generate large gains for customers, employees and managers (see 
Starbuck and Nystrom 1981). However, despite their pervasiveness, the impact of 
‘structuring’ dimensions of an organization is contingent on many other 
organizational characteristics, such as strategy processes (Pettigrew 1973; Pfeffer 
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1981), and on the serendipitous nature of organizational life in general. It is therefore 
likely that the degree of participation in decision-making may have mixed effects on 
performance.  
On the one hand, it has been suggested that centralized decision-making is 
integral to the effective and efficient functioning of any large bureaucracy (e.g. 
Goodsell 1985; Ouchi 1980). For example, Taylor (1911) famously argued that the 
‘scientific’ management of organizations was only possible where decision-making 
was restricted to a small cadre of planners. On the other hand, centralization is 
associated with many of the dysfunctions of bureaucracy, especially rigidity, red tape 
and abuses of monopoly power (e.g. Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971; Tullock 1965). For 
instance, Lipsky (1980) highlighted that bureaucratic controls may lead front-line staff 
to devote disproportionate time to finding ways to by-pass established decision-
making procedures, thereby damaging internal and external accountability. Broadly 
speaking, then, the substance of this divergence about the structuring of internal 
decision-making is summarized in two rival positions. Proponents of centralized 
decision-making suggest that it leads to better performance by facilitating greater 
decision speed, providing firm direction and goals, and establishing clear lines of 
hierarchical authority thereby circumventing the potential for damaging internal 
conflict. By contrast, supporters of more participative decision-making suggest that 
centralization harms performance by preventing middle managers and street-level 
bureaucrats from making independent decisions, enshrining inflexible rules and 
procedures, and undermining responsiveness to changing environmental 
circumstances. The plausibility of both views thus implies that centralization may 
have inconsistent, contradictory or even no meaningful effects on performance.  
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Prior Research 
Empirical studies in the private sector have failed to find a consistent or substantial 
relationship between centralization and performance (see Bozeman 1982; Dalton, 
Todor, Spendolini, Fielding and Porter 1980; Wagner 1994). Likewise, studies in the 
public sector have so far uncovered contrasting effects on performance (see table 1). 
Centralization has been shown by Glisson and Martin (1980) to have a large 
statistically significant positive effect on the productivity of human service 
organizations in the US, even when controlling for other aspects of organizational 
“structuring” such as formalization. They also found a small positive effect on 
efficiency. However, although this study implies that centralization may play an 
important role in determining the quantity of organizational output, its effect may be 
related in a different manner to alternative measures of service performance. For 
instance, Whetten (1978) found that centralization had a positive effect on the output 
of US manpower agencies, but a negative one on staff perceptions of effectiveness. 
Maynard-Moody, Musheno and Palumbo’s (1990) analysis of street-level bureaucracy 
highlights that program implementation in two contrasting US community 
correctional organizations was best where there was  “greater street-level influence in 
policy processes” (845). Indeed, other researchers have furnished evidence to suggest 
that excluding professional staff from decision-making is likely to result in poor 
quality public services (Ashmos, Duchon, McDaniel, Jr 1998; Holland 1974; Martin 
and Segal 1977).  
 
[Position of TABLE 1] 
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Research which has drawn exclusively on subjective ratings of organizational 
effectiveness has found little or no relationship between centralization and 
performance. While Moynihan and Pandey (2005) uncover a negative relationship 
between centralization and perceptions of effectiveness in 83 US human and health 
services, Wolf’s exhaustive (1993) case survey of bureaucratic effectiveness found no 
significant relationship between centralization and performance in a range of US 
federal agencies. Similarly, in an earlier investigation, Fiedler and Gillo (1974) show 
that decentralizing decision-making has little effect on the comparative performance 
of different faculties within community colleges. Researchers have stated that the lack 
of appropriate hard performance criteria is the major weakness of studies of 
centralization in both the public and private sector (Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, 
Fielding and Porter 1980). To remedy this we use a hard measure of publicly audited 
service achievements in our analysis.  
Overall, theoretical arguments and the small number of existing empirical 
studies of organizational structure and public service delivery suggest that 
centralization is likely to have contradictory effects (if any) on performance. This 
leads to the following null hypothesis: 
 
H0 centralization is unrelated to performance. 
 
CENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE: 
THE MODERATING EFFECT OF STRATEGY 
Although the existing evidence on centralization and public service performance is 
mixed, it is likely that the effect of structure on performance is mediated by other 
organizational characteristics. Contingency theorists argue that one important way in 
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which effectiveness can be maximized is by developing appropriate linkages between 
different internal management characteristics (Doty, Glick and Huber 1993). In 
particular, Chandler (1962) famously argued that strategic choice was the critical 
variable in explaining how organizations could successfully achieve the optimum fit 
between the articulation and achievement of their goals. To fully understand how the 
degree of centralization may influence performance, it is therefore important to 
explore the combined effect of centralization and strategy, particularly as there is 
currently no prior research on this critical issue in the public sector.   
Organizational strategy can be broadly defined as the overall way in which an 
organization seeks to maintain or improve its performance. This is relatively stable 
and unlikely to alter dramatically in the short term (Zajac and Shortell 1989). We base 
the conceptualization of strategy used in our analysis on Miles and Snow’s (1978) 
four “ideal types” of organizational stance. Prospectors are organizations that “almost 
continually search for market opportunities, and … regularly experiment with 
potential responses to emerging environmental trends” (Miles and Snow 1978, 29).  
These organizations often pioneer the development of new products and services.  
Defenders are organizations that take a conservative view of new product 
development.  They typically “devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of 
their existing operations” (Miles and Snow 1978, 29), competing on price and quality 
rather than on new services or markets.  Analyzers represent an intermediate category, 
sharing elements of both prospector and defender. Rarely “first movers”, they “watch 
their competitors closely for new ideas, and … rapidly adopt those which appear to be 
most promising” (Miles and Snow 1978, 29).  Reactors are organizations in which top 
managers lack a consistent and stable strategy for responding to perceived change and 
uncertainty in their organizational environments. A reactor “seldom makes adjustment 
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of any sort until forced to do so by environmental pressures” (Miles and Snow 1978, 
29). 
Boyne and Walker (2004) assess the application of the Miles and Snow (1978) 
framework to public organizations. They argue that a mix of strategies is likely to be 
pursued at the same time, so it is inappropriate to categorize organizations as 
belonging solely to a single type (e.g. reactor or prospector). This logic also implies 
that Miles and Snow’s “analyzer” category is redundant because all organizations are 
prospectors and defenders to some extent. Hence, we view the range of organizational 
strategies found in public organizations as comprising prospecting, defending and 
reacting. 
Miles and Snow (1978) argued that the successful pursuit of whatever strategy 
was selected by an organization would depend on adopting the appropriate internal 
structure and processes.  In other words, it was necessary to establish a fit between the 
strategy being pursued and the internal characteristics of an organization.  A 
misalignment between strategy and structure would hinder performance. 
Organizations face not only an “entrepreneurial” problem (which strategy to adopt), 
but also an “administrative” problem (the selection of structures that are consistent 
with the strategy).  Administrative systems have both a “lagging” and a “leading” 
relationship with strategy: 
 
“As a lagging variable, the administrative system must rationalize, 
through the development of appropriate structures and processes, the 
strategic decisions made at previous points in the adjustment process.  
As a leading variable … the administrative system will facilitate or 
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restrict the organization’s future capacity to adapt” (Miles and Snow 
1978, 23). 
 
Thus, over time, strategy and structure reinforce each other. As a result, prospectors 
and defenders have distinctive structures, whereas reactors, lacking a coherent and 
stable strategy, have no consistent internal arrangements. 
Miles and Snow (1978) argue that, for defenders, “the solution to the 
administrative problem must provide management with the ability to control all 
organizational operations centrally” (41).  This is because a defender is attempting to 
maximize the efficiency of internal procedures.  A defender resembles a classic 
bureaucracy in which “only top-level executives have the necessary information and 
the proper vantage point to control operations that span several organizational 
subunits” (Miles and Snow 1978, 44).  By contrast, the prospector’s administrative 
system “must be able to deploy and coordinate resources among many decentralized 
units and projects rather than to plan and control the operations of the entire 
organization centrally” (Miles and Snow 1978, 59).  Decisions are therefore devolved 
to middle managers and front-line staff so that they can apply their “expertise in many 
areas without being unduly constrained by management control” (Miles and Snow 
1978, 62).  Finally, reactors, unlike defenders or prospectors, have no predictable 
organizational structure: some may be centralized while others are decentralized. 
Therefore, they “do not possess a set of mechanisms which allows them to respond 
consistently to their environments” (Miles and Snow 1978, 93). 
This set of arguments led Miles and Snow to suppose that prospectors would 
be decentralized, while defenders would be centralized. Where these relationships 
between strategy and structure obtained, they argued, organizations would improve 
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their performance. Likewise, Chandler’s (1962) analysis of industrial enterprises 
suggests that those organizations that adapt their structure to meet new strategic goals 
operate more efficiently and are more likely to achieve their goals. Nonetheless, Miles 
and Snow posit that this relationship will not hold for organizations adopting a reactor 
strategy, as they will be unable to develop structures consistent with their changeable 
strategic choices. The application of this model to the public sector therefore leads to 
the following hypotheses: 
 
H1 Centralization is likely to be positively related to performance in an 
organization with a defender stance 
H2 Decentralization is likely to be positively related to performance in an 
organization with a prospector stance 
H3 Neither centralization nor decentralization is related to performance in an 
organization with a reactor stance 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT, DATA AND MEASURES 
The organizational context of our analysis is UK local government, specifically local 
authorities in Wales. These organizations are governed by elected bodies with a 
Westminster-style cabinet system of political management.1 They are multipurpose 
authorities providing education, social care, regulatory services (such as land use 
planning and waste management), housing, welfare benefits, leisure and cultural 
services. This range of services represents a suitable context for testing the 
relationship between centralization, strategy and performance across different public 
organizations. By restricting our analysis to Welsh service departments, other 
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potential influences on performance, such as the policies of higher tiers of government 
and legal constraints, are held constant.  
Some cases could not be matched when we mapped the independent variables 
on to the dependent variable, due to missing data within the datasets. As a result, our 
statistical analysis of the relationship between centralization, strategy and 
performance was conducted on 53 cases, comprising eight education departments, 
nine social services departments, seven housing departments, seven highways 
departments, ten public protection departments and twelve benefits and revenues 
departments. These departments are representative of the diverse operating 
environments faced by Welsh local authorities, including urban, rural, socio-
economically deprived, and predominantly Welsh or English speaking areas. When 
estimating the separate and joint effects of centralization and strategy we also control 
for other potential influences on service standards. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The performance of all major Welsh local authority services is measured and 
evaluated every year through statutory performance indicators set by their most 
powerful stakeholder: the National Assembly for Wales, which provides over 80% of 
local government’s funding. The National Assembly for Wales Performance 
Indicators (NAWPIs) are based on common definitions and data which are obtained 
by councils for the same time period with uniform collection procedures (National 
Assembly for Wales 2001). Local authorities in Wales are expected to collect and 
collate these data in accordance with the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy “Best Value Accounting – Code of Practice”. The figures are 
independently verified, and the Audit Commission assesses whether “the management 
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systems in place are adequate for producing accurate information” (National 
Assembly for Wales 2001, 14). Because Welsh local authorities are judged on the 
same set of indicators by their primary stakeholder, we are able to compare the 
performance of organizations with varying strategies and structures. Prospecting, 
defending and reacting service departments are all expected to achieve the same 
objectives, but they are free to do so in distinctively different ways. 
For our analysis we used 29 of the 100 service delivery NAWPIs available for 
2002 that focus most closely on service performance, examples of which include: the 
average General Certificate in Secondary Education (GCSE) score, the number of 
pedestrians killed or seriously injured in road accidents and the percentage of welfare 
benefit renewal claims processed on time (see table 1A in the Appendix for the full 
list). To standardize the NAWPIs for comparative analysis across different service 
areas we took z-scores of each performance indicator2 for all Welsh authorities and 
created composite measures of performance by combining different indicators within 
a service to produce an average score which was then combined with other service 
scores.3 Table 2 lists the descriptive data and sources for our dependent variable.  
 
[Position of TABLE 2] 
 
Independent Variables 
Organizational Centralization and Strategy 
Data on centralization and strategy were derived from an electronic survey of senior 
and middle managers in Welsh local authority service departments conducted in 
autumn 2002. Survey respondents were asked a series of questions on strategic 
management in their service. For each question, informants placed their service on a 
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seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (disagree with the statement) to 7 (agree with 
the statement).4 
 We collected data from different tiers of management to ensure that our 
analysis took account of different perceptions within the service departments. This 
surmounts sample bias problems associated with surveying informants from only one 
organizational level. Heads of service and middle managers were selected for the 
survey because research has shown that attitudes differ between hierarchical levels 
within organizations (Aiken and Hage 1968; Payne and Mansfield 1973; Walker and 
Enticott 2004).5 These informants are also the organizational members who are likely 
to know most about structure and strategy.  The sampling frame consisted of 198 
services and 830 informants. Responses were received from 46 per cent of services 
(90) and 29 per cent of individual informants (237) – a similar response rate to studies 
of strategic management and performance in the private sector (e.g. Gomez-Mejia 
1992; Zahra and Covin 1994). Time-trend extrapolation tests for nonrespondent bias 
(Armstrong and Overton 1977) revealed no significant differences between the views 
of early and late respondents to the survey. Nonetheless, it is still conceivable that our 
findings are limited by the possibility that the 70% of survey non-respondents may 
have provided different responses to those that were received. 
Our measures of organizational centralization are based on variables which 
evaluate both the power to make decisions and the degree of involvement in decision-
making at different levels within the sample organizations (Hart and Banbury 1994). 
Four items from the survey were used to measure hierarchy of authority and 
participation in decision-making (see table 2). Hierarchy of authority was measured 
by combining two items focusing on whether strategy-making was carried out by the 
Chief Executive Officer alone or collectively within the senior management team. 
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Participation in decision-making was assessed by combining two items gauging the 
degree of staff involvement in decision-making. The resulting measures of hierarchy 
of authority and participation in decision-making exhibit strong Cronbach’s Alpha 
internal reliability scores of .74 and .89 respectively (Nunnally 1978). 
Our measures of organizational strategy are listed in table 3. To explore the 
extent to which Welsh local authorities displayed defender characteristics, informants 
were asked three questions assessing whether their approach to service delivery was 
focused on core activities and achieving efficiency (Miller 1986; Snow and Hrebiniak 
1980; Stevens and McGowan 1983). A prospector strategy was operationalized 
through four measures of innovation and market exploration, as these are central to 
Miles and Snow’s (1978) definition of this orientation. The specific measures are 
derived from Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) and Stevens and McGowan (1983). To 
evaluate the presence of reacting characteristics our informants were asked five 
questions about the existence of definite priorities in their service and the extent to 
which their behaviour was determined by external pressures. These measures were 
primarily based on prior work (Snow and Hrebiniak 1980).  
 
[Position of TABLE 3] 
 
Underlying strategic stances amongst Welsh local services were revealed through 
exploratory factor analysis of the twelve survey items for all the service departments 
involved in the survey. This produced three statistically significant and clear factors 
that explained 67.1 per cent of the variance in the data. The results indicated that 
measures of defending, prospecting, and reacting load on one common factor each. 
The eigenvalues for all three factors are high, suggesting that the services sampled in 
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this study display distinctive strategies. The factor loadings are all 0.4 or more, and 
are therefore important determinants of the variance explained by the factors (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, and Black 1998). The prospecting and reacting factors have 
excellent Cronbach’s Alpha internal reliability scores of .82 and .84 respectively 
(Nunnally 1978). Although the defending factor has a comparatively low Cronbach’s 
Alpha score of .60, it is nevertheless suitable for exploratory analysis of new scales 
(Loewenthal 1996). 
 
Past Performance 
Public organizations are best understood as autoregressive systems which change 
incrementally over time (Meier and O’Toole 1999; O'Toole and Meier 2004). This 
indicates that performance in one period is strongly influenced by performance in the 
past. It is important to include prior achievements in statistical models of 
performance, to ensure that the coefficients for other variables such as centralization 
and strategy are not biased.  We therefore entered performance in the previous year in 
our analysis of service standards in 2002/03. By including the autoregressive term, the 
coefficients for structure and strategy also show what these variables have added to 
(or subtracted from) the performance baseline. 
 
Service Expenditure 
Performance may vary not only because of internal decision-making characteristics 
and organizational strategies, but also because of the financial resources expended on 
services. Spending variations across services may arise for a number of reasons (the 
level of central government support, the size of the local tax base, and departmental 
shares of an authority’s total budget). A comparatively prosperous service in one 
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authority may be able to buy better performance while a comparatively poor one in 
another area can afford to subsidize only mediocrity.  Prior research suggests that 
public expenditure levels do have a significant positive impact on performance 
(Boyne 2003). We controlled for potential expenditure effects by using figures drawn 
from the 2000/01 NAWPIs.6 
 
External Constraints 
The Average Ward Score on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Department of 
Environment, Transport and Regions 2000) was used as a measure of the quantity of 
service needs.  This deprivation score is the standard population-weighted measure of 
deprivation used by UK central government. It provides an overview of the different 
domains of deprivation (e.g. income, employment and health). To measure diversity 
of service need we squared the proportion of each ethnic group (taken from the 2001 
census, Office for National Statistics 2003) within a local authority and then 
subtracted the sum of the squares of these proportions from 10,000.  The measure 
gives a proxy for “fractionalization” within a local authority area, with a high level of 
ethnic diversity reflected in a high score on the index.7  
 
Interviews with Service Managers 
As well as conducting the survey, we interviewed 32 managers in a sample of Welsh 
local authority services during 2003. These interviewees were survey respondents 
who indicated a willingness to discuss strategic management in their service in more 
depth. Semi-structured interview schedules were used, subject to strict principles of 
confidentiality. The interviews explored issues arising from the survey return for each 
respondent’s service. In particular, the nature of decision-making and strategy-making 
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within services identified by our survey data as primarily prospecting, defending and 
reacting. The information obtained from these interviews provided further data on the 
links between centralization, strategy and performance across a range of services and 
authorities. This, in turn, aided interpretation of the results of our statistical model. 
 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The results for the statistical tests of the impact of centralization and strategy on 
public service performance are shown in tables 4 and 5.  We present four models in 
the following sequence: model 1 contains the control variables and our hierarchy of 
authority measure. By including all three interaction terms in model 2, we then show, 
when controlling for other strategy-structure configurations, which strategic stance 
most moderates the effect of hierarchy of authority.8 Model 3 contains the control 
variables and our participation in decision-making measure. The inclusion of all three 
interaction terms in model 4 shows which strategy has the most important moderating 
effect on the relationship between participation in decision-making and performance, 
when controlling for other strategy-structure configurations. The average Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) score is less than 2 for all the independent variables in each 
model (including those with multiple interactions included). The results are therefore 
not distorted by multicollinearity (Bowerman and O’Connell 1990). In all of the 
models, robust estimation of the regression standard errors was used to correct for the 
potential effects of non-constant error variance (Long and Ervin 1980).  
The average R2 of the models is above 70% and is significant at 0.01 or better. 
Furthermore, all the control variables have the expected signs and most (3 out of 4) 
are statistically significant in each model. Performance is indeed autoregressive – the 
relative success of service departments tends to be stable from one year to the next. 
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Nevertheless, service standards are influenced by other variables. In particular, 
deprivation and ethnic diversity, as expected, consistently have a significant negative 
association with performance. The effects of the performance baseline and external 
constraints suggest that the models provide a sound foundation for assessing the 
effects of centralization and strategy.9  
 
Centralization and Performance 
The results for model 1 shown in table 4 and model 3 in table 5 support our null 
hypothesis for centralization and performance. The coefficients for hierarchy of 
authority and participation in decision-making are statistically insignificant.  
 
 [Position of TABLE 4] 
 
The results suggest that neither centralized nor decentralized decision-making 
has an independent effect on public service performance. However, it is conceivable 
that the supposed costs and benefits of centralization for service performance cancel 
each other out: fast decision-making may be counterbalanced by a need for building 
support for decisions in public organizations which are held accountable by many 
different stakeholders, including politicians, service users, the media and employees. 
Alternatively, it may simply be the case that the degree of both hierarchy of authority 
and participation in decision-making are unrelated to how well services perform. The 
actual process of service delivery and its outcomes are not affected if an organization 
concentrates the opportunity and power to make decisions in only a few hands or if 
decision-making is distributed more evenly throughout an organization. A further 
possibility is that the effects of centralization are mediated by other critical 
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determinants of performance, especially organizational strategy. The introduction of 
our strategy interactions within the model provides strong support for this 
explanation. 
 
Centralization, Strategy and Performance 
The statistical results presented in models 2 and 4 are consistent with H1: the 
coefficients for “hierarchy of authority times defending” and “participation in 
decision-making (inverted) times defending” are positive and statistically significant. 
However, the evidence is only partially consistent with H2: the coefficient for 
“participation in decision-making times prospecting” is statistically significant with a 
positive sign in model 4, while the coefficient for “hierarchy of authority (inverted) 
times prospecting” in model 2 is not statistically significant. The results furnish 
support for H3: the coefficients for each “basic structure term times reacting” are all 
statistically insignificant. The findings thus provide a clear indication that centralized 
defenders are likely to have high performance: the coefficients for both “hierarchy of 
authority times defending” and “participation in decision-making (inverted) times 
defending” are positive and statistically significant, even when controlling for 
alternative strategy-structure configurations. The models also suggest that prospecting 
will improve performance if carried out in combination with a high level of decision 
participation, but that we cannot be certain about its influence on service 
achievements when combined with a low degree of hierarchical authority.10 F-tests 
revealed that the R2 change when interaction terms are introduced was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 per cent level. This highlights that the degree of “fit” between 
strategy and structure is an important determinant of public service performance.  
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[Position of TABLE 5] 
 
Organizations that adopt a defending strategy enhance their performance if 
they centralize authority and reduce decision participation. Although research has 
shown that centralized decision-making can increase goal ambiguity (Pandey and 
Wright 2006), it may be especially conducive to maintaining stable service priorities 
where top management teams have adopted a strategy of making operations more 
efficient. Whetten’s (1978) study of manpower agencies suggests that centralization 
facilitates such production-orientated goals because it reduces environmental 
uncertainty and provides a clear indication of the service mission to middle managers 
and front-line staff. Indeed, one of our interviewees in a defending service suggested 
that management and decision-making in the service had become more centralized as 
the Corporate Management Board sought to respond to an increasingly hostile 
operating environment. This had increased efficiency by reducing the 
“inconsistencies” sometimes associated with decentralized decision-making, 
especially intra-organizational communication and office administration costs.  
Centralization may have had a positive influence on the recent introduction of 
performance management and planning in Welsh local government (Boyne, Gould-
Williams, Law and Walker 2002). Miles and Snow (1978) argue that such 
organizational processes are key characteristics of successful defenders. In another 
defending service, an interviewee highlighted that the implementation of a new 
performance management framework had hinged on “a lot of pulling together with the 
director and the [authority’s] Chief Executive Officer”. It is conceivable that 
defending is especially conducive to the achievement of objectives which are 
comparatively stable over time. Although many NAPWIs are of recent origin, some 
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formally gauge service departments’ achievements against well-established measures 
of performance, such as school examination results. By focusing on core activities and 
maintaining stable priorities, defending may improve performance on such indicators 
at a more consistent rate than an innovative and risk-taking prospecting strategy.  
Organizations which encourage staff involvement in decision-making provide 
better services if they are prospectors, but appear to be unlikely to reap improvements 
by delegating the authority to make decisions. Involving staff in decision-making may 
enable senior managers to more effectively identify opportunities for improving 
service delivery. Decision participation can maximize the points of contact between 
service managers and users, leading to more responsive service development. 
Evidence from the mental health care sector suggests decentralizing decision-making 
enables managers to provide clients with more individual attention leading to better 
clinical outcomes (Holland 1973). Similarly, Maynard-Moody, Musheno and 
Palumbo (1990) stress that: street-level bureaucrats “savvy about what works as a 
result of daily interactions with clients, should have a stake in the decision-making 
process” (845). Decision participation can permit greater leeway for independent 
thinking to influence strategic management. An interviewee from a successful 
prospecting education service indicated that their high performance had been partly 
attributable to increased involvement of school head-teachers in strategic decision-
making.  
By contrast, the coefficient for the interaction with hierarchy of authority 
suggests that prospecting organizations may be unlikely to achieve gains in 
performance by devolving control over strategic decisions. It seems to make no 
difference whether prospecting organizations have a low or high degree of 
hierarchical authority. Our findings therefore suggest that participation in decision-
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making may be the most influential aspect of centralization in determining 
organizational outcomes. Indeed, the coefficients for our significant decision 
participation interactions are larger than those for our significant hierarchy interaction. 
This buttresses Hage and Aiken’s (1967) conclusion that “participation in decision-
making seems to be the more important dimension of the distribution of power than 
hierarchy of authority” (p.88).  
McMahon (1976), Richter and Tjosvold (1980) and Tannenbaum (1962) all 
find that extending participation in decision-making can increase organizational 
effectiveness by enhancing mutual influence, motivation and satisfaction. Our 
qualitative data furnishes some evidence corroborating these results for prospecting 
organizations. In one prospecting service, an interviewee stated that more 
decentralization meant that “staff morale has improved, because there is more 
feedback on how they are performing.” Such affective consequences may be less 
evident in organizations with a low degree of hierarchy, because middle managers and 
front-line staff may simply be held individually rather than collectively responsible 
for decisions. In other words, the potentially positive influence of professionalization 
on organizational performance is likely to be contingent on decision participation 
rather than the chain of command (see Hage and Aiken 1967). The combined effect of 
different aspects of decentralization and employee norms and motivation within 
public organizations is an issue which merits extended empirical investigation. 
 The degree of hierarchy of authority and participation in decision-making 
made no difference to the performance of organizations that adopted a reactor 
strategy. For reactors, strategy is typically set by external circumstances. It is 
therefore conceivable that the relative degree of centralization does not influence 
service outcomes in reacting organizations because it has no substantive impact on the 
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content of their decisions. For example, a manager in one reacting service indicated in 
an interview that their decisions were essentially determined by a national strategic 
framework and local political issues. In such circumstances, both senior and middle 
managers have far less scope to positively influence service delivery decisions. An 
alternative explanation is that reacting organizations simply do not have the capacity 
to make authoritative decisions or encourage meaningful participation in decision-
making even if they are presented with an opportunity to do so. In another reacting 
service, a manager noted in interview that he was concerned they would be unable to 
benefit from a less stringent performance management regime because there was 
“limited ability to recognize issues and deal with them.” This is consistent with 
evidence that the development of structures for coping with uncertainty is critical for 
managers seeking to increase their ability to make and implement decisions (Hinings, 
Hickson, Pennings and Schneck 1974).   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has explored the separate and joint effects of centralization and 
organizational strategy on public service performance. The statistical results show that 
variations in public service performance are unrelated to hierarchy of authority and 
the degree of participation in decision-making when these variables are examined in 
isolation; but the effect of structure on performance is mediated by organizational 
strategy, even when controlling for past performance, service expenditure and 
external constraints. As a result, Miles and Snow’s (1978) hypothesis on structure and 
strategy was given broad confirmation: high performance appears to be more likely 
for public organizations that match their decision-making structure with their strategic 
stance. Defending organizations with a high degree of hierarchical authority and low 
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staff involvement in decision-making, in particular, perform better, but prospecting 
organizations with high decision participation are also likely to do well. This finding 
was borne out in organizations with the same task. For example, further analysis of 
our quantitative data revealed that two high-performing education services had 
directly contrasting strategy-structure alignments. By contrast, hierarchy of authority 
and participation in decision-making make no difference to the performance of 
reacting organizations. These results have important implications for public 
management theory and practice. 
Our analysis expands on work on centralization and public service 
performance in several ways. First, it establishes a connection between centralization, 
strategy and public service improvement. Previous public sector studies have so far 
focused on the independent impact of centralization on performance (e.g. Whetten 
1978). Second, the analysis uses a “hard” measure of effectiveness that is a more 
robust indicator of performance than perceptual measures of output or efficiency (e.g. 
Glisson and Martin 1980). Because these measures are statutorily enforced by central 
government they are applicable to services with different strategies. Third, the unit of 
analysis is different service departments in multipurpose local authorities rather than 
functional units within single purpose organizations (e.g. Fiedler and Gillo 1974) or a 
single type of public service (e.g. Ashmos, Duchon, McDaniel, Jr 1998). Thus our 
results may be more generalizeable than those obtained in previous studies, because 
they apply to a variety of public services. The results also complement the growing 
evidence base generated by public management researchers on the link between other 
important dimensions of organization structure and performance (e.g. Meier and 
Bohte 2000; Meier and O’Toole 2001).     
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Public service reforms often emphasize the importance of decentralized 
organizational structures as a means for delivering responsive and effective services 
(e.g. Office of Public Service Reform 2002). A modified view, given support here, is 
that the relative degree of hierarchy of authority and the level of participation in 
decision-making are significant determinants of performance only when they are 
matched with the “right” organizational strategy. Governments should therefore pay 
closer attention to the interaction of structure and strategy.  
To fully explore how public organizations can benefit from matching structure 
and strategy it would be essential for researchers and policy-makers to trace the 
antecedents of strategic choice in the public sector and consider the extent to which 
these are susceptible to central and local discretion. In particular, contingency 
theorists suggest that organizations need to adapt their strategy to the environmental 
circumstances that they face. One study (Richardson, Vandenberg, Blum and Roman 
2002) shows that such boundary conditions mediate the relationship between 
participation in decision-making and financial performance in healthcare treatment 
centres. Further investigation of the relationship between organizational “fit” and 
performance would provide important information on the policy levers that should be 
pulled to enhance the impact of public sector reform. Interactions between structure, 
strategy and environment could therefore be an integral part of future models of 
public service performance.  
There are, of course, some limitations of the article. Our analysis has 
examined a particular group of public organizations during a specific time period. The 
results may simply be a product of where and when we chose to conduct the survey. It 
would therefore be important to identify whether the relative importance of matching 
structure and strategy differs over other time periods and in other organizational 
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settings both in the UK and elsewhere. Our use of cross-sectional data also raises the 
issue of causality. It is possible that causation leads in the reverse direction to that 
hypothesized: levels of performance in certain contexts determine the adoption of 
particular strategies and organizational structures (Khandwalla 1977). Nevertheless, 
the control for prior performance in our analysis serves to mitigate this causality 
problem. Future evaluations could pool data over a longer time period to study the 
lagged effect of strategic choice in greater depth. A further important problem with 
the data used here is the possibility that the dependent variable is not capturing all of 
the relevant dimensions of service performance.  
Prior research suggests that centralization has important implications for staff 
and client perceptions of performance (e.g. Holland 1973; Whetten 1978). Subsequent 
studies could explore whether the relationships between centralization and service 
performance presented here are replicated for the performance assessments made by 
other stakeholders, such as managers, front-line staff and service users. Moreover, the 
remaining variation in the dependent variable may be attributable to other dimensions 
of organizational structure, such as formalization or specialization, which we were 
unable to examine with this data set. Further research on centralization, strategy and 
service performance would thus gain from developing and testing comprehensive 
models that include the separate and combined effects of additional measures of 
internal organizational characteristics. Exploration of the independent and combined 
effects of strategy and structure across organizations with very different tasks could 
also speak to Gulick and Urwick’s (1937) classic concern with the relationship 
between organizational function and structure. Detailed investigation of their 
argument that structural form should follow function would be possible with a larger 
sample of organizations from each major local government service area. This could 
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throw further light on the relative influence of strategy and service mission on the 
structure-performance hypothesis.  
For now, we can conclude that contingency theories offer great hope for public 
management scholars seeking to explain the impact of organizational structure on 
service performance. Our findings provided strong statistical support for the argument 
that appropriate combinations or configurations of structure and strategy make a 
difference to organizational success. As a result, this study contributes to a growing 
body of evidence which provides public managers with a basis for diagnosis and 
prescription of organizational choices.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1A Service performance and expenditure measures 2001-2003 
Service area Effectiveness NAWPI Expenditure NAWPI 
Education Average General Certificate in Secondary Education (GCSE) 
or General National Vocational Qualification (GNVQ) points 
score of 15/16 year olds  
%  15/16 year olds achieving 5 or more GCSEs at grades A*-
C or the vocational equivalent 
%  15/16 year olds achieving one or more GCSEs at grade G 
or above or the vocational equivalent 
% 11 year olds achieving Level 4 in Key Stage 2 Maths  
% 11 year olds achieving Level 4 in Key Stage 2 English  
% 11 year olds achieving Level 4 in Key Stage 2 Science 
% 14 year olds achieving Level 5 in Key Stage 3 Maths  
% 14 year olds achieving Level 5 in Key Stage 3 English 
% 14 year olds achieving Level 5 in Key Stage 3 Science 
%  15/16 year olds achieving at least grade C in GCSE 
English or Welsh, Mathematics and Science in combination 
% 15/16 year olds leaving full-time education without a 
recognized qualification (inverted) 
Net expenditure per nursery 
and primary pupil under five 
Net expenditure per primary 
pupil aged five and over 
Net expenditure per secondary 
pupil under 16 
Net expenditure per pupil 
secondary pupil aged 16 & 
over 
Social 
services 
Percentage of young people leaving care aged 16 or over with 
at least 1 GCSE at grades A*-G, or GNVQ 
Cost of children’s services per 
child looked after 
Housing Proportion of rent collected1 
Rent arrears of current tenants (inverted) 
Rent written off as not collectable (inverted) 
Average weekly management 
costs  
Average weekly repair costs  
Highways Pedestrians killed or seriously injured in road accidents per 
100,000 population (inverted)  
Cyclists killed or seriously injured in road accidents per 
100,000 population (inverted) 
Motorcyclists killed or seriously injured in road accidents per 
100,000 population (inverted) 
Car users killed or seriously injured in road accidents per 
100,000 population (inverted) 
Other vehicle users killed or seriously injured in road 
accidents per 100,000 population (inverted) 
Pedestrians slightly injured in road accidents per 100,000 
population (inverted) 
Cyclists slightly injured in road accidents per 100,000 
population (inverted) 
Motorcyclists slightly injured in road accidents per 100,000 
population (inverted) 
Car users slightly injured in road accidents per 100,000 
population (inverted) 
Other vehicle users slightly injured in road accidents per 
100,000 population (inverted) 
Cost of highway maintenance 
per 100 km travelled by a 
vehicle on principal roads 
Cost per passenger journey of 
subsidized bus services 
Average cost of maintaining 
street lights 
Public 
protection 
Domestic burglaries per 1,000 households (inverted)  
Vehicle crimes per 1,000 of the population (inverted) 
Total net spending per capita2 
Benefits& 
revenues 
Percentage of renewal claims processed on time 
Percentage of cases processed correctly 
Cost per benefit claim 
 
1. This performance indicator was not collected in 2002/03. Thus the 
organizational effectiveness measure for that year is made up of only two 
housing PIs. 
2. Spending per capita for the local government as a whole is used as expenditure 
data for this service area are not available.  
 31
Footnotes 
1 In a Westminster political system such as the UK, the cabinet represents the de facto 
executive branch of government, and is usually made up of senior members of the 
ruling political party, all of whom collectively decide public policy and government 
strategy.  
2 We inverted some performance indicators (e.g. the percentage of rent written off as 
not collectable) so scores above the mean always indicated higher performance.  
3 The use of z-scores also allows the data for different services to be pooled, because 
the measurement process removes service effects from the scores on the indicators 
(Andrews, Boyne and Walker 2006). Each indicator was weighted equally for our 
aggregation method, ensuring that our analysis was not unduly influenced by 
particular indicators. Factor analysis was not used to create proxies for each 
performance dimension because the number of cases per service area is too small to 
create reliable factors (see Kline 1994). We obtained similar statistical results when 
we repeated our analysis using a performance measure which gave one ‘key’ indicator 
for each service area a weight equal to the total number of indicators in that area. For 
example, the percentage of benefits cases processed correctly was multiplied by two 
before being added together with the percentage of renewal cases processed on time 
and a mean benefits service score taken.  
4 We piloted the survey instrument with four senior managers drawn from four major 
services in one local authority. The instrument was improved in line with the 
respondents’ recommendations by adding a glossary of terms, including further 
questions about the nature of services, and stressing the need for respondents to 
provide an “honest appraisal”. Following the pilot process, e-mail addresses were 
collected from participating authorities and questionnaires were distributed via email. 
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The electronic questionnaires were self-coding and converted to SPSS format for 
analysis. To generate service level data suitable for our analysis, informants’ 
responses within each service were aggregated. The average score of these was taken 
as representative of that service. So, for instance, if there were two informants from a 
highways department, one from road repair services and another from traffic planning 
services, then the mean of their responses was used. 
5 This was confirmed for our data by t-tests for differences between the views of these 
two echelons which revealed statistically significant different mean responses for nine 
out of the sixteen survey items used in our analysis. The relative distribution of 
respondents from the two echelons varies across organizations due to differences in 
structures and nonresponse rates. To ensure comparability we therefore used an 
unweighted mean response for each organization. Examination of the potential biases 
associated with this method is an important topic for further research.  
6 Coverage of service expenditure data is less comprehensive in the NAWPIs 
following this year. Furthermore, research has shown that relative levels of spending 
in local authority departments vary little year on year (Danziger, 1978; Sharpe and 
Newton, 1984). To make them suitable for analysis, the z-scores for the service 
expenditure indicators were taken for all Welsh authorities. Aggregated measures of 
expenditure for each service were then created by adding groups of relevant indicators 
together and taking the mean. So, for instance, we added together the z-scores for two 
indicators of housing expenditure (the average weekly costs per local authority 
dwelling of management and the average weekly costs per local authority dwelling of 
repairs) and divided the aggregate score in each local authority service by two. We 
then repeated this method for expenditure indicators in education, social services, 
highways, public protection and benefits and revenues, thereby deriving a single 
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measure of expenditure that is comparable across the six service areas. The indicators 
used for our expenditure measure are shown in Table 2A in the Appendix. 
7 Skewness tests revealed that ethnic diversity and our item measuring the extent to 
which strategy was made by the chief executive were not normally distributed (test 
results of 5.211 and 3.385). Log transformation is the standard technique for reducing 
the effect of positive skew, so logged versions of both variables were used in the 
analysis. 
8 Skewness tests revealed that “hierarchy of authority times defending” was not 
normally distributed (test result of -2.03). Square transformation is the usual technique 
for reducing the effect of negative skew, so we added thirty to this interacted term 
before squaring it. To aid interpretation of our results we then transformed all of our 
interacted terms by dividing them by 100.  
9 Similar results to those presented were obtained by adding each interaction singly to 
the base models and by using the separate items measuring hierarchy of authority and 
participation in decision-making. Analogous findings are also obtained when using 
Huber-White robust standard errors to control for the possibility of intra-class 
correlation (results available on request).  
10 The marginal effect of strategy in combination with centralization on performance 
is positive for each of the statistically significant interaction terms. 
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TABLE 1 Impact of centralization on public service performance 
Study Organizations and sample size Dimension of 
centralization 
Dimension of performance Net  effect on 
performance 
Ashmos, Duchon and 
McDaniel 1998 
52 Texan hospitals Participation in decision-
making 
Staff perceptions of output  
Staff perceptions of 
efficiency 
- 
- 
Fiedler and Gillo 1974  55 community college faculties in 
Washington state 
Participation in decision-
making 
Perceptions of teaching 
performance 
NS 
Glisson and Martin 1980 30 organizations in one US city Hierarchy of authority 
Participation in decision-
making 
Productivity 
Efficiency 
+ 
+ 
Holland 1974 1 Massachusetts mental health 
institution 
Hierarchy of authority 
Participation in decision-
making 
Outcomes - 
Martin and Segal 1977 23 halfway houses for alcoholics 
in Florida 
Hierarchy of authority Outcomes - 
Maynard-Moody, Musheno 
and Palumbo 1990 
2 community correctional facilities 
in Oregon and Colorado 
Participation in decision-
making 
Perceptions of 
implementation success 
- 
Moynihan and Pandey 2005 83 US state level health and 
human service agencies 
Hierarchy of authority Staff perceptions of 
effectiveness 
- 
Whetten 1978 67 New York manpower agencies Participation in decision-
making 
Output  
Staff perceptions of 
effectiveness 
+ 
- 
Wolf 1993 44 US cabinet agencies Hierarchy of authority Bureaucratic effectiveness NS 
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics, including survey items for measures of 
centralization 
 
 Mean Min Max s.d. 
Service performance 02/03 .08 -1.56 1.92 .64 
Service performance 01/02 .07 -1.51 1.92 .72 
Service expenditure 00/01 .05 -1.43 2.40 .89 
Deprivation 24.10 12.31 40.02 7.20 
Ethnic diversity 564.35 353.27 1326.01 194.37 
Hierarchy of authority     
Strategy for our service is usually made 
by the Chief Executive 
2.23 1.00 6.00 1.19 
Strategy for our service is usually made 
by the Corporate Management Team 
3.30 1.00 7.00 1.65 
Participation in decision-making     
All staff are involved in the strategy 
process to some degree 
4.70 1.00 7.00 1.53 
Most staff have input into decisions that 
directly affect them 
4.79 1.67 7.00 1.34 
Data Sources: 
Service performance 2001-
2003 
 
 
 
 
Service expenditure 
2000/01 
 
Deprivation  
 
 
Ethnic Diversity 
 
 
 
 
National Assembly for Wales. 2003. National 
Assembly for Wales Performance Indicators 2001-
2002. www.lgdu-wales.gov.uk; and National 
Assembly for Wales. 2004. National Assembly for 
Wales Performance Indicators 2002-2003. 
www.lgdu-wales.gov.uk  
Audit Commission (2001) 2000/2001 Local authority 
performance indicators in England and Wales, 
London: HMSO. 
Department of Environment, Transport and Regions 
(2000) Indices of Multiple Deprivation, London: 
DETR.  
Office for National Statistics. (2003). Census 2001: 
Key Statistics for Local Authorities. London: TSO. 
The measure comprised 16 ethnic groups: White 
British, Irish, Other White, White and Black 
Caribbean, White and Black African, White and 
Asian, Other Mixed, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, 
Other Asian, Caribbean, African, Other Black, 
Chinese, Other Ethnic Group.  
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TABLE 3 Survey items and factor analysis for strategy archetypes 
Measures Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
 
Prospector 
   
We continually redefine our service priorities -.31 .71 .07 
We seek to be first to identify new modes of 
delivery 
-.20 .86 .01 
Searching for new opportunities is a major part of 
our overall strategy 
-.38 .74 .20 
We often change our focus to new areas of service 
provision 
.11 .82 -.16 
 
Defender 
   
We seek to maintain stable service priorities -.09 .07 .79 
The service emphasizes efficiency of provision -.34 .31 .62 
We focus on our core activities .00 -.19 .79 
 
Reactor 
   
We have no definite service priorities .77 -.21 -.07 
We change provision only when under pressure 
from external agencies 
.89 -.04 -.12 
We give little attention to new opportunities for 
service delivery 
.70 -.41 -.10 
The service explores new opportunities only when 
under pressure from external agencies 
.90 -.05 -.07 
We have no consistent response to external 
pressure 
.47 -.35 -.23 
    
Eigenvalues 3.31 2.95 1.79 
Cumulative variance 27.60 52.21 67.10 
N=90    
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TABLE 4 Hierarchy of authority, strategy and public service performance 
 
Independent variable Model 1 s.e. Model 2 s.e. 
Constant 4.354** 1.482 3.948** 1.278 
Past performance .629** .075 .611** .066 
Service expenditure .026 .062 .072 .054 
Deprivation -.016 .009 -.018* .007 
Ethnic diversity (log) -1.407** .491 -1.351** .422 
Hierarchy of authority -.020 .020 -.034* .017 
Hierarchy of authority x defending   .044** .0015 
Hierarchy of authority (inverted) x 
prospecting 
  .421 .436 
Hierarchy of authority x reacting    .862 .751 
     
R2 .625**  .730**  
Adjusted R2 .586**  .681**  
N=53     
 
Note: significance levels: *p   ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 (Two-tailed tests) 
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TABLE 5 Participation in decision-making, strategy and public service 
performance 
 
Independent variable Model 3 s.e. Model 4 s.e. 
Constant 4.495** 1.318 4.528** 1.139 
Past performance .659** .070 .700** .062 
Service expenditure .040 .057 .034 .050 
Deprivation -.019* .008 -.023** .007 
Ethnic diversity (log) -1.402** .434 -1.394** .385 
Participation in decision-making -.019 .017 -.016 .018 
Participation in decision-making 
(inverted) x defending 
  1.721* .801 
Participation in decision-making x 
prospecting 
  1.020* .456 
Participation in decision-making x 
reacting  
  .603 .396 
     
R2 .679**  .782**  
Adjusted R2 .645**  .743**  
N=53     
 
Note: significance levels: *p   ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 (Two-tailed tests) 
 
